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Ebola  preparedness  in  Oman:
An experience  from  the  Middle  East
The Ebola  virus  outbreak  created  great  chal-
lenges for  healthcare  systems  in  Africa  and  other
countries where  patients  were  treated.  Much  of
the reporting  about  Ebola  preparedness  outside
the epidemic  area  has  focused  on  European  or
North  American  responses.  We  write  to  add  a per-
spective  on  how  these  challenges  were  faced  in
a different  health  economy  in  the  Middle  East,
where resources  are  not  always  as  accessible  and
social  attitudes  about  the  quarantine  and  burial
of infectious  patients  are  heavily  inﬂuenced  by
prevailing  religious  customs.  This  report  summa-
rizes the  Omani  experience  in  preparing  to  identify
and  manage  patients  with  Ebola  virus  disease.
It highlights  the  process  of  creating  policies  and
procedures  and  details  the  challenges  in  the  imple-
mentation  and  auditing  of  the  response  plan.
As the  Ebola  outbreak  in  West  Africa  progressed
rapidly after  February  2014,  there  were  no  inter-
national  travel  or  trade  restrictions  to  affected
countries, and  the  alarming  situation  received  con-
siderable  international  media  attention,  including
in Oman.  The  WHO  declared  the  Ebola  outbreak
as a  public  health  emergency  of  international  con-
cern on  the  8th of  August  2014  [1],  and  the  Ministry
of Health  of  Oman  formed  a  national  taskforce
to develop  a  national  preparedness  plan,  includ-
ing appropriate  algorithms  and  standard  operating
procedures  [2].  These  were  largely  derived  from
accessible  WHO  and  US  Centers  for  Disease  Control
and Preparedness  guidelines  and  were  adapted  for
local publication  and  use  in  English  and  Arabic  [3].
Prior to  this,  there  was  no  national  plan  or  ded-
icated physical  resources  to  handle  patients  with
viral hemorrhagic  fevers,  although  the  Sultanate
has evolved  plans  to  manage  and  contain  other
infections, such  as  avian  and  swine  ﬂu  and  MERS
Co-V [2].  Health  services  in  each  governorate  were
asked to  develop  their  own  operational  response
plans based  on  the  new  national  plan  and  to  conduct
self-assessments  against  an  audit  checklist.  Speciﬁc
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bola centers,  which  facilitated  the  targeted  train-
ng and  allocation  of  resources.  A  one-day  national
orkshop  was  conducted  that  addressed  all  of  the
esponse  elements  of  the  national  plan  and  was  fol-
owed by  additional  workshops  conducted  in  all  the
overnorates.
Emergency  medical  response  teams  and  the  pub-
ic health  sector  of  the  National  Civil  Defense
ommittee were  also  involved.  The  preparedness
nd response  operational  plan  was  discussed  at
 national  and  multisectoral  level  that  helped
lan for  surge  management.  A  family  of  ﬁve  from
man  returned  from  the  Democratic  Republic  of
ongo when  the  ﬁrst  case  of  Ebola  was  diag-
osed and  were  followed  as  contacts  by  the  public
ealth team.  One  child  from  this  family  was  suc-
essfully  treated  for  severe  malaria.  This  early
xperience revealed  many  practical  problems  that
nformed  further  national  and  local  planning.  Drills
ere performed  in  all  governorates  and  ports  of
ntry.
Oman has  strong  historical  links  with  East  Africa,
nd many  Omanis  travel  to  and  from  Central
nd West  Africa.  Additionally,  many  students  and
eople working  in  Oman  originate  from  Central
nd West  Africa.  The  taskforce  concentrated  on
lgorithms  and  standard  operating  procedures  to
anage arrivals  at  air-  and  seaports.  Several  meet-
ngs were  held  between  the  taskforce  and  senior
xecutives  in  civil  aviation,  airport  management
ompanies and  port  authorities.  Self-declaration
orms were  distributed  to  all  airlines  originating
rom Africa.  Many  changes  were  made  to  health
acilities in  the  ports  of  entry,  and  a facility  was
repared  for  institutional  quarantine.  The  Ministry
f Health  made  legal  provision  for  quarantine  in
he homes  of  travelers  arriving  from  West  Africa,
lthough this  was  only  required  for  18  people.
gain, exercises  revealed  many  issues  that  were
emedied  by  the  adaptation  of  plans,  the  purchase
f equipment  and  further  training  regarding  infec-
ion control  for  all  concerned  parties  in  the  ports
f entry.
nces. Published by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
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Lbola  preparedness  in  Oman  
Many  public  educational  activities  were  con-
ucted through  the  media,  and  a  risk  management
lan for  communication  with  the  public  was  devel-
ped. However,  the  public  perceived  Ebola  drills
s cases  of  Ebola,  and  social  media  ampliﬁed  this
isconception.
Burial  and  funeral  rituals  in  Oman  are  based  on
haria (Islamic  laws).  Usually,  the  process  includes
any  steps  that  involve  close  contact  with  the
ody of  the  deceased  person.  Close  relatives  of  the
eceased  usually  perform  the  washing  ceremony
n his  or  her  home.  There  was  a  paucity  of  med-
cal and  Islamic  literature  regarding  methods  for
andling  deceased  bodies  of  victims  of  highly  infec-
ious agents  [4].  Some  of  this  has  been  addressed  in
ore recent  publications  [5]. The  team  obtained  a
etailed fatwa  (religious  opinion)  from  the  Ministry
f Endowments  and  Religious  Affairs.  This  fatwa
llowed for  ﬂexibility  to  proceed  based  on  a  medi-
al assessment  of  the  risk  of  infection  transmission,
nd suitable  methods  were  decided  upon  for  the
urial of  Ebola  victims  or  victims  of  any  highly  infec-
ious disease  [2].  The  taskforce  produced  guidelines
ddressing the  main  points,  the  most  important  of
hich was  the  process  of  and  location  for  prepar-
ng the  body  [5]. It  was  directed  that  this  step
f the  process  should  be  performed  by  a trained
ealthcare worker  in  an  isolation  room  for  the
eceased within  the  healthcare  facility.  Full  body
ashing  is  avoided,  and  a  disinfectant  is  applied
rior to  placing  the  body  in  double  ﬂuid-resistant
ags, with  disinfectant  applied  between  the  lay-
rs to  avoid  any  transfer  of  disease.  The  ambulance
hould transport  the  body  to  the  burial  area,  where
 grave  at  least  two  meters  in  depth  should  be
repared.  After  the  grave  is  covered,  the  prayer
eremony can  occur  with  a  limited  number  of
eople.
A surge  of  Crimean  Congo  hemorrhagic  fever
ases occurred  in  Oman  in  October  2014  around
he Hajj  period,  and  18  cases  were  diagnosed,  with
ne fatality  [6].  The  performance  of  hospitals,  par-
icularly strict  adherence  to  infection  prevention
nd control  practices,  was  an  instrumental  bench-
ark,  and  the  outbreak  was  successfully  managed
ith no  known  secondary  cases.  Safe  burial  prac-
ices  according  to  the  guidelines  were  followed  for
he one  deceased  patient.
The  taskforce  faced  many  challenges,  starting
ith the  writing  of  guidelines,  because  the  avail-
ble  published  literature  was  tailored  to  a  Western
udience  and  sometimes  recommended  the  use
f methods  or  materials  that  are  very  difﬁcult
nd expensive  to  adapt  to  our  Omani  lifestyle
nd customs.  In  addition,  there  were  controversies
bout how  to  handle  travelers  from  Ebola-endemic
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ountries,  and  there  was  no  clear  international
uidance on  quarantine  procedures.
In practice,  it  was  difﬁcult  to  obtain  ade-
uate supplies  of  many  items  such  as  disposable
uits for  personal  protection  equipment  for  health-
are personnel  because  supplies  had  already  been
xhausted  for  use  in  West  Africa,  North  America  and
urope. This  added  difﬁculty  to  the  standardization
f training  of  healthcare  workers  in  health  insti-
utions  and  ambulance  services.  Regrettably,  we
ave not  yet  received  all  of  the  necessary  equip-
ent due  to  the  great  international  demand  and
ompetition  for  resources.  In  common  with  experi-
nces in  the  USA  and  Europe,  waste  management
nd the  decontamination  of  ambulances  and  air-
rafts are  a serious  concern.  The  largest  practical
hallenge in  Oman  is  the  lack  of  incinerators  and
utoclaves,  even  in  some  large  hospitals,  and  there
re no  private  companies  competent  or  willing  to
ispose of  medical  waste  in  some  governorates.
here are  no  biosafety  level  3  or  4  laboratories
n Oman;  therefore,  samples  from  suspected  Ebola
ases must  be  sent  abroad.  Many  shipment  compa-
ies refuse  to  transfer  samples  labeled  as  category
. Fifty  certiﬁed  lab  technicians  from  through-
ut the  country  were  trained  in  the  triple  packing
ystem.
In summary,  the  recent  outbreak  of  Ebola
xposed deﬁciencies  in  the  health  system  that
equire additional  time,  ﬁnancial  resources  and
ersonnel  to  function  properly  in  the  future.  The
mani government  instituted  a prompt  national
esponse and  developed  the  ﬁrst  (or  only)  website
n our  region  dedicated  to  both  medical  and  social
spects  of responding  to  Ebola,  and  there  is  a great
eed to  continue  this  work  in  collaboration  with
eighboring  Gulf  Cooperation  Countries.  Our  plans
ave been  tested  by  other  local  viral  hemorrhagic
evers, and  we  believe  that  with  the  current  level
f preparedness,  it may  be  difﬁcult  to  prevent  the
rst case  of  Ebola  from  occurring;  however,  we  are
ufﬁciently  prepared  to  prevent  secondary  cases.
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